We exploit a natural experiment associated with a large merger in the Swedish market for analgesics (painkillers). We confront the predictions from a merger simulation study, as conducted during the investigation, with the actual merger e¤ects over a two-year comparison window. The merger simulation model is based on a constant expenditures speci…cation for the aggregate nested logit model (as an alternative to the typical unit demand speci…cation). The model predicts a large price increase of 34% by the merging …rms, because there is strong market segmentation and the merging …rms are the only competitors in the largest segment. The actual price increase after the merger is of a similar order of magnitude, but in fact even larger: +42% in absolute terms and +35% relative to the "control group"of non-merging rivals. These …ndings at …rst sight suggest strong support for merger simulation and structural models more generally. But a closer look at a wider range of merger predictions leads to more nuanced conclusions. First, both merging …rms raised their prices by a similar percentage, while the simulation model predicted a larger price increase for the smaller …rm. Second, the merging …rms' market shares dropped, as predicted by the model, but some of the outsider …rms' market shares also dropped (in favor of other …rms). We discuss the possible reasons for the divergence between the predicted and actual e¤ects.
Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the usefulness of structural econometric models to predict counterfactual outcomes. Angrist and Pischke (2010) document the recent successes of "design-based" or "treatment e¤ects" approaches in various …elds, such as labor and development economics. They suggest that industrial organization would also greatly bene…t from a more intense focus on "natural experiments", taking empirical merger analysis as a test case example. At a minimum, they write, empirical evidence should be provided that structural econometric models can deliver reasonably accurate predictions. In a response, Nevo and Whinston (2010) acknowledge that the treatment e¤ects approach may be useful to estimate the e¤ects from mergers. But they also point out limitations, and discuss several circumstances where a structural model and merger simulation can be more useful. The most obvious instance arises when a competition authority has to evaluate the likely price e¤ects of a proposed merger, and does not have information from closely comparable past mergers in the same or related markets. Both Angrist-Pischke and Nevo-Whinston agree that more retrospective merger analysis is clearly needed.
In this paper we provide such an analysis based on a large recent merger between AstraZeneca Tica (AZT) and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in the Swedish market for over-thecounter analgesics (painkillers). The merger raised competition concerns, since AZT and GSK were the only companies in the largest market segment, which is based on the active substance paracetamol (called acetaminophen in the U.S.). During the investigation, we conducted a merger simulation study for the Swedish competition authority. We allowed for various possible scenario's. Our preferred model was a constant expenditures speci…cation for the nested logit model; this is a new variant where price enters logarithmically instead of linearly as in the typical unit demand speci…cation. The model predicted a substantial price increase in the paracetamol segment in the absence of e¢ ciencies and new entry: +34% under Bertrand competition and + 28% under partial coordination (before and after the merger). The competition authority nevertheless decided to clear the merger in April 2009. First, it still expected su¢ cient competition from the other two main segments (and it referred to our predictions which did not rule out negligible price e¤ects in the absence of su¢ ciently large e¢ ciencies). Second, and probably more importantly, it was optimistic that the coming deregulation of the pharmacy monopoly would encourage new entry and competition.
A few years after the merger we are able to perform an ex post merger analysis. We confront the predicted price e¤ects, using the simulation methodology as developed during the investigation, with the actual price e¤ects under a two-year comparison window. We obtain striking …ndings. The merging …rms' actual price increase is of a similar order of magnitude, but in fact even larger than the price increase predicted by the model: +42% in absolute terms, or +35% in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence interpretation where the other …rms are the control group. This price increase materialized almost immediately, just one month after the merger, and remained for the entire two-year window after the merger.
At …rst sight, these results provide strong support for the merger simulation approach in competition policy, and for the usefulness of structural models more generally. However, more nuanced conclusions are warranted after examining a wider range of merger predictions (which we had not yet presented during the investigation although they follow straightforwardly from the merger simulation model). First, our model predicts that the smaller …rm in the merger, GSK, would raise its prices by much more than the larger …rm, AZT, while in reality the two companies raised their prices by approximately the same percentage. Second, although our model predicts the market share drop of the merging …rms fairly well, it did not predict a market share drop by one of the outsiders (in favor of other outsiders). We discuss possible reasons for the divergence between the predicted and actual e¤ects, i.e. the possibility that other things did not remain constant after the merger or that the model speci…cation can be improved. It was possible to test these richer merger predictions, thanks to the unusually large size of the considered merger (where the two merging …rms are the only competitors in a segment with limited substitution from other segments).
Our paper contributes to three related strands in the literature: merger simulation, ex post merger evaluation and ex post evaluation of merger simulation.
Merger simulation Merger simulation as a tool for competition policy was introduced by Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Werden and Froeb (1994) . Subsequent research has looked at a variety of issues, such as alternative demand models, e.g. , Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) or Ivaldi and Verboven ( 2005) . Some of this work has explicitly compared di¤erent demand models and showed how di¤erent functional forms may result in rather di¤erent price predictions, see Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden (2003) , Huang, Rojas and Bass (2008) and Slade (2009) . While these comparisons are informative, it is di¢ cult to disentangle the sources of the di¤erences since the compared models di¤er in many respects. In contrast, we compare di¤erent speci…cations in a uni…ed demand framework, the nested logit model. As an alternative to the typical unit demand model, we propose the constant expenditures demand model. This enables us to concentrate on the role of the functional form of the price variable, while abstracting from other sources of speci…cation di¤erences (such as more ‡exible substitution patters for the cross-price elasticities).
Quite surprisingly, the constant expenditures nested logit model has not been used before in empirical work, although it is equally tractable as the unit demand model. We show that only three modi…cations of the typical estimating equation are required: (i) price enters logarithmically instead of linearly, (ii) market shares are expressed in values instead of units, and (iii) the potential market size refers to the potential aggregate expenditures (in values) instead of the potential number of consumers or households. Apart from the additional ‡exibility from a new functional form for the price variable, the constant expenditures speci…cation had a particular feature that also be relevant in other applications: the pattern of price elasticities across models is quasi-independent of price, instead of quasi-linearly increase in price as in logit, nested logit and random coe¢ cients logit models with unit demand.
Our simulation model also provides greater ‡exibility on the supply side. We do not only allow for a standard multi-product Bertrand Nash model. We also allow for the possibility that …rms partially coordinate, already before the merger. We introduce a partial coordination parameter, the weight that …rms give on their competitors' pro…ts when setting prices. This enables one to better calibrate the premerger marginal costs if reliable outside information on cost is available.
Ex post merger evaluation Ex post merger analysis moved in parallel with merger simulation, and mainly aimed to evaluate the relevance or e¤ectiveness of competition policy towards mergers. Early work focused on mergers in major industries, such as airline markets (Borenstein, 1990; Kim and Singal, 1993), banking (Facacelli and Panetta, 2003) and petroleum (Hastings, 2004; Gilbert and Hastings, 2005; Hosken, Silvia and Taylor, 2011) . Most recently, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) take advantage of scanner data to assess mergers in …ve di¤erent branded goods industries. They …nd moderate but signi…cant price e¤ects in the range of 3-7%. Among other things, they argue that their estimates may be viewed as a lower bound on price increases that would have occurred for other mergers that were blocked.
Ex post evaluation of merger simulation There is only a small recent literature that combines both traditions to compare the predictions from mergers simulations with the actual merger e¤ects. Peters (2006) looks at the simulated and actual price increases by the merging …rms'in several airline mergers. Weinberg and Hosken (2009) and Weinberg (2011) look at the price increases of both the merging …rms and their competing rivals. These papers …nd mixed support on the performance of merger simulation: the qualitative predictions are in line with the data, but the quantitative predictions show some divergence. Relative to this interesting early work, we make three related contributions. First, we evaluate the performance of merger simulations based on a merger simulation framework that had already been speci…ed during the investigation, i.e. entirely before the merger had been consummated. Second, we consider a large merger in a concentrated market. This results in large price predictions, which enables us to make quite sharp comparisons, even if other things have changed after the merger. Third, we consider more demanding tests for the merger simulation methodology, since we assess a broader set of merger predictions: we do not only consider the price predictions for each of the merging …rms and their competitors, but also the predictions regarding the …rms'market shares. More broadly speaking, this large "natural experiment"is therefore not only of interest to evaluate the performance of merger simulations, but also to draw lessons for the relevance of policy counterfactuals in a variety of other oligopoly settings with di¤erentiated products (such as environmental policies, trade policies, taxation, etc).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the industry background, including the merger decision and the dataset. Section 3 develops the framework for merger simulation, as developed during the investigation. Section 4 discusses the empirical results for the demand model and merger simulations, as presented during the case. Section 5 provides the ex post analysis. We …rst present additional predictions from the merger simulations, not presented during the case but based on the same methodology. Next we confront these predictions with what actually happened in terms of prices and market shares of the merging …rms and their competitors.
Industry background
In April 2009, the Swedish competition authority cleared the acquisition of AstraZeneca Tika (AZT) by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). In this section we provide the relevant industry background to introduce the simulation study we conducted for the competition authority during the investigation, and to motivate our ex post analysis carried out several years later. First, we review the market for over-the-counter analgesics or painkillers. Next, we describe the merger between the two companies, GSK and AZT. Finally, we elaborate on the datasets used for the investigation and post-merger analysis.
The market for OTC painkillers
Over-the-counter analgesics or painkillers are non-prescription drugs to treat pain and fever. Painkillers come in three main active substances: paracetamol (called acetaminophen in the U.S.), ibuprofen and acetylsalicylic acid (ASA or aspirin). There are also two less important active substances: diclofenak and naproxen. The active substances may di¤er in the types of pains they relieve and in their side e¤ects. Paracetamol treats most pains and fevers, and is known for having little side e¤ects (except that it may damage the liver). Ibuprofen also treats most pains and fevers and is often used to reduce in ‡ammations, but it may have side e¤ects on the stomach. The ASA substance also has a blood-diluting e¤ect, which has both advantages and disadvantages. While each active substance may therefore relieve pain and reduce fever in di¤erent ways and with di¤erent side e¤ects, consumer perceptions on the companies' brands may also be important. This is evident from the large amount of advertising in the sector. So it is ultimately an empirical question to which extent brands with di¤erent active substances are substitutes.
Painkillers also come in various administrative forms. Tablets are the most important form, followed by …zzy tablets. There are also some other forms (such as liquid, suppository and powder), but these are much less important. Table 1 shows the market shares of the three main substances and the two main administrative forms, according to the total value of sales in 2008.
1 With a market share of 42%, paracetamol is by far the most important substance. Ibuprofen and ASA each have a comparable market share of 29%. Paracetamol and Ibuprofen are mainly sold as tablets, whereas ASA is dominantly sold as …zzy tablets. All companies specialize in one or at most two active substances. They typically sell one main brand per segment, and sometimes an additional smaller brand. Table 2 shows the 2008 market shares of the companies and their brands, broken down by active substance. This shows that the two merging companies AZT and GSK are the only companies in the paracetamol segment: AZT sells Alvedon as its main brand and Reliv as a smaller brand, whereas GSK sells the popular brand Panodil . McNeil (selling Ipren) and Nycomed (selling Ibumetin) are the main companies in the Ibuprofen segment. McNeil (selling Treo) is by far 1 Taken together, these three substances and two forms account for 90% of the market. the largest company in the ASA segment. There are two other companies with much smaller market shares: Meda and Bayer.
Until the deregulation of 2009, the companies distributed all their drugs through the state-owned pharmacy monopoly, Apoteket AB. In 2008 Apoteket operated 850 community pharmacies, 76 hospital pharmacies and 30 shops for over-the-counter and health care services. The pharmaceutical companies determined the wholesale prices, but indirectly also the retail prices, since Apoteket applied a …xed percentage markup on the wholesale prices. After a market investigation, the Swedish government decided to deregulate the distribution of pharmaceutical products in 2009. Several state pharmacies were sold to private companies, and non-pharmacy retail outlets became entitled to sell non-prescription drugs. The reforms also gave more freedom to the pharmacies in various respects. For example, there were no longer obligations to sell all available products in a non-discriminatory fashion, and it became possible to set di¤erent retail prices across the country. The government expected that the deregulation of the distribution system would increase competition and encourage entry of new products. for example including the paracetamol substance. In this way, the buying power of pharmacies and retailers would improve, which could possibly result in improved price competition between the di¤erent products available in the self-care market. After conducting a special investigation, the Swedish Competition Authority found that GSK's acquisition of AZT would not manifestly impede e¤ective competition and no action was taken regarding this concentration."
In its Decision, the competition authority described that it based its analysis on a large number of contacts in the industry. It also made a brief reference to the merger simulation study we had conducted for the competition authority during the investigation. It wrote that the simulation study showed that mergers would not lead to signi…cant price increases. As we discuss in detail below, our simulation study covered a wide range of scenario's, with and without e¢ ciencies, and with and without partial coordination between companies. Our simulations only predicted insigni…cant price increases in one scenario with large e¢ ciencies. Hence, the competition authority's reference to our simulation results may suggest it implicitly had in mind large e¢ ciencies. An alternative possibility is that the competition authority put a large weight on the coming deregulation of the pharmacy monopoly and considered this su¢ ciently promising to create new competition and compensate for the increase in market power without deregulation.
Datasets for merger simulation and ex post analysis
During its investigation, the competition authority obtained a rich dataset on the painkiller market from Apoteket AB. The dataset contains monthly aggregate sales information for Sweden during the period 1995-2008 at the level of the product. A product is de…ned as a brand, form, packsize and dose. For example, one of AZT's products is Alvedon tablet, 30 pieces, 500 mg/piece. An observation for product j in month t contains information on the price, p jt , the total sales volume, q jt , and the total sales value or revenue, r jt = p jt q jt . The dataset was combined with two other datasets, one on marketing expenditures by brand and month (collected by Sifo RM), and one on macro-economic variables (from statistics Sweden), such as nominal and real GDP, the number of sick men and sick women (all monthly) and total population of men and women (yearly).
The competition authority collected the dataset for a general descriptive analysis, but in particular to enable us to conduct the simulation study during the investigation. The total number of observations (products/months) during 1995-2008 is 11,185, which amounts to an average of 67 available products per month. The number of observations for the three main active substances (paracetamol, ibuprofen and ASA) and the two main administrative forms (tablets and …zzy tablets) is 7,240. This amounts to an average of 43 products per month. We conducted our analysis on both the full dataset and on the reduced dataset, and obtained robust conclusions. In the remainder of this paper, we focus the discussion on the reduced dataset, which covers about 90% of the total value of sales. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the main variables over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Total sales value r jt refers to Apoteket's total sales per product/month across all its pharmacies in Sweden, expressed in 1 million Swedish Krone (SEK), including VAT. Total sales volume q jt refers to the number of units sold per product/month across the country. Price p jt is the average selling price, including VAT (i.e. r jt =q jt ). This coincides with the transaction price paid by every consumer, since Apoteket is required to set uniform prices across all its pharmacies in Sweden.
There is no unambiguous measure for the unit of consumption in the market for painkillers, and hence no obvious measure for the sales volume q jt and the price p jt of each product. In particular, it is not appropriate to measure q jt as the number of sold packages and p jt as the price per sold package, since the products are sold in di¤erent packsizes (number of tablets) and in di¤erent doses (mg per tablet). We use three di¤erent measures for the unit of consumption. The …rst measure is the "tablet" (or …zzy tablet). The second measure is the de…ned daily dose, or "ddd", as de…ned by the World Health organization. The third measure is the "normal dose", i.e. the number of doses used on a normal single consumption occasion. We thus have three measures of price -price per tablet, price per ddd, and price per normal dose -and three corresponding measures of sales volume. Table 3 shows that the average price per tablet is 1.1SEK, the average price per normal dose is slightly higher, 1.6 SEK, and the average price per ddd is 6.0. More importantly, these measures do not just di¤er through a scale factor: for example, the ratio of the means to the standard deviations suggest there is more variation in price per normal dose than in price per tablet. During the investigation, we performed a sensitivity analysis using each of the three price and volume measures. We will focus the discussion here on the results from the …rst measure (price per tablet and number of sold tablets), but we will point out possible di¤erences when using the other measures. Two years after the competition authority's investigation, we collected an update of the main dataset from Apoteket AB (now maintained by XXX because of the deregulation). The updated dataset again contains monthly sales information (price, sales volume, and sales value), now for the period 2008 up to May 2011. We thus again collected the information for the year 2008: although we already had this information, this enabled us to verify whether the assembled data were consistent with our previously obtained data, and we veri…ed this was the case. We also updated some of the macro-economic variables, i.e. nominal and real GDP. We no longer collected information on the other variables, since they were only used for estimating the demand model, and we did not aim to update this in our ex post analysis.
Framework for merger simulation
We now present the framework for the merger simulation, as we developed it during the competition authority's investigation. We …rst motivate and discuss our adopted demand model, used to estimate the substitution patterns across products. We then present the model of oligopolistic price-setting behavior, used to uncover premerger marginal costs and to predict postmerger prices.
Unit demand versus constant expenditures nested logit
To conduct the merger simulation, we developed a two-level nested logit model for the demand for painkillers. The model incorporates consumer heterogeneity along two discrete product dimensions: the products'active substance (paracetamol, ibuprofen and ASA) and their administrative form (tablet and …zzy tablet). The nested logit model thus accounts for the possibility of market segmentation, by allowing cross-price elasticities to be greater between products that have the same active substance and/or administrative form. Segmentation according to the active substance may be particularly relevant for the proposed merger, since the merging companies are the only ones active in the paracetamol segment. Segmentation according to the administrative form may however also be relevant. Our market share tables in section 2 showed that two substances (paracetamol and ibuprofen) are mainly sold as tablets, while the other substance (ASA) is mainly sold as …zzy tablets. Hence, if form turns out to be a relevant source of segmentation, this will reveal that consumers mainly substitute from paracetamol to ibuprofen products (both dominantly sold as tablets) and less so to ASA products (sold mainly as …zzy tablets).
As shown by Berry (1994) , the aggregate nested logit model can be transformed into a linear estimating equation and is therefore simple to estimate. But this comes at a cost, since the model only allows for consumer heterogeneity along discrete product dimensions and not for heterogeneity in the valuation of continuous characteristics. Accounting for such heterogeneity would require estimating Berry's (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes'(1995) aggregate random coe¢ cients logit model. Even though there have been many applications (in particular since practitioner's guide), estimating a full random coe¢ cient model remains considerably more complicated because of practical numerical di¢ culties, as recently documented by for example Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) . Since in our application the two discrete product dimensions, substance and form, appear important aspects behind consumer heterogeneity, we felt reasonably con…dent that the more tractable nested logit model would capture the pattern of cross-price elasticities fairly adequately.
We were however more concerned with the pattern of elasticities as induced by the typically adopted functional form for the price variable. Quite surprisingly, the aggregate discrete choice literature since Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) has adopted a utility speci…cation where price enters linearly (or, more generally, enters additively with income). This speci…cation has the property that consumers buy one unit of their preferred product. While this may be an appealing property for some commodities such as automobiles, it may be less realistic for many frequently purchased consumer items. More importantly, the linear price speci…cation implies that the price elasticities of di¤erent products are quasilinearly increasing in prices: if product A is twice as expensive as product B, it also tends to have a price elasticity that is twice as high. This property does not only hold in the logit and nested logit model, but also to some extent in the random coe¢ cients logit model.
For example, in an interesting paper on the same industry, Chintagunta (2002) estimates a random coe¢ cients logit model for …ve main (U.S.) painkiller brands. 4 Although he …nds signi…cant consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of price, the estimated own-price elasticities show an increasing relationship with prices across products. 5 This pattern is not unrealistic per se, but it does follow from the linear price speci…cation, as also documented in other random coe¢ cients logit models (e.g. Grigolon and Verboven, 2011) . In our application, we were particularly concerned with the linear price speci…cation because, unlike Chintagunta (2002) , we have many brands and a large price variation across brands: as shown in Table 3 , the highest and lowest price di¤er by a factor of …ve (only a factor of two in Chintagunta, 2002) . We therefore propose an alternative possible utility speci…cation, where price (as well as income) enters logarithmically instead of linearly. In this speci…cation consumers do not buy one unit of their preferred product (perfectly inelastic conditional demand), but rather a constant expenditure (unit elastic conditional demand). We will obtain an estimating equation that is equally simple as Berry's aggregate logit model, with three di¤erences: price enters logarithmically instead of linearly, market shares are measured in values instead of volumes, and the potential market refers to the potential aggregate budget instead of the potential number of consumers. The implied own-and cross-price elasticities are quasiconstant in price, instead of quasi-linearly increasing in price as in the unit demand model. To our knowledge, no other work has departed from the unit demand model in discrete choice models with aggregate purchasing data. Hendel (1999) and Dubé (2004) used micro-level data to estimate multiple-discrete choice models, where purchasers can buy multiple units as well as multiple products.
Individual utility There are I consumers, i = 1 I. Each consumer chooses one out of J + 1 di¤erentiated products, j = 0 J; good 0 is the outside good or no-purchase alternative. Suppose consumer i has the following conditional indirect utility for good j = 0 J:
where x j is a vector of observed product characteristics of product j, p j is price, j captures unobserved product characteristics, y i is income of individual i and " ij is a random utility term or an individual-speci…c taste parameter for good j. In a typical speci…cation, f (y i ; p j ) = f (y i p j ), so that consumers buy one unit of their preferred product. Speci…ca-tion (1) allows income and price to enter non-additively, so that consumers may buy multiple units of their preferred product. We …rst consider an individual consumer's decision how many units to buy from her preferred product. Next, we derive her decision which product to buy, based on random utility maximization. Finally, we obtain the aggregate and inverted aggregate demand system for all products.
Conditional individual demand Conditional on buying product j, a consumer i's demand for product j, d ij , follows from Roy's identity
Consider the following two speci…cations for f (y i ; p j ):
Conditional on choosing j, an individual buys a …xed unit in the …rst speci…cation and spends a constant fraction of her budget, , in the second speci…cation.
Random utility maximization Each consumer i chooses the product j that maximizes random utility u ij . Using (2), we can write utility (1) as follows
where K i = y i in the unit demand speci…cation and K i = ln y i in the constant expenditures speci…cation), and j is the mean utility component of product j:
Normalize the mean utility of the outside good to zero, 0 = 0. The random utility terms " ij follow the extreme value distributional assumptions of a two-level nested logit model. Partition the set of products into G groups, g = 0; : : : ; G, where group 0 is degenerate and only consists of the outside good 0. Further partition each group g into H g subgroups, h = 1; : : : ; H g . Each subgroup h of group g contains J hg products, so that P G g=1 P Hg h=1 J hg = J. Given random utility maximization, the probability that a consumer i chooses product j = 1; : : : ; J takes the following well-known form:
where I hg , I g , and I, are "inclusive values", de…ned by:
is a J 1 vector containing the mean utilities j , and = ( 1 ; 2 ) are the nesting parameters associated with the nested logit distribution, measuring the preference correlation across products of the same subgroup ( 1 ) or group ( 2 ). Note that the separable terms K i cancel out from the choice probabilities (5).
As shown by McFadden (1978) , the model is consistent with random utility maximization if 1 1 2 0. When 1 is high, consumer preferences are strongly correlated across products of the same subgroup, and when 2 is high, consumer preferences show additional correlation across products of the same group. Further intuition obtains from considering a few special cases. If 1 = 2 , the model reduces to a one-level nested logit model, where groups are the nests: preferences only show correlation across products of the same group; there is no additional correlation across products of di¤erent subgroups within a group. If 1 > 2 = 0, the model also reduces to a one-level nested logit model, where the subgroups are the nests. Finally, if 1 = 2 = 0, the model reduces to a simple logit model, so consumer preferences do not show correlation across products from the same subgroups or groups.
Aggregate and inverted aggregate demand We can now derive the aggregate demands q j for products j = 1; : : : ; J. Aggregate demand for product j is the probability that a consumer buys product j multiplied by the quantity purchased, d ij , summed over all consumers. Under the two utility speci…cations (2) we obtain the following aggregate demand system for j = 1; : : : ; J:
where s j ( ; ) is given by (5), B = Y and Y = P I i=1 y i . Hence, B is the total potential budget allocated to the di¤erentiated products in the economy, a constant fraction of total income of all consumers Y .
The goal is to estimate the parameters ( ; ; ) entering the demand system (7). The econometric error term j enters non-linearly through the mean utility terms (4). To obtain a tractable model with a linear error term j , we proceed in two steps. In the …rst step, we follow Berry (1994) and invert the system of choice probabilities s j = s j ( ; ), j = 1; : : : ; J, to solve for the mean utilities j = j (s; ) as a function of the choice probability vector s. Following Berry (1994) for the one-level nested logit and Verboven (1996) for the two-level nested logit, we obtain the inverted choice probability system
where s jjhg = s j . P J hg k=1 s k is the probability of choosing j given that an alternative from subgroup h of g is chosen (the …rst factor in (5)), and where s hjg = P J hg k=1 s k
. P H hg h=1 P J hg k=1 s k is the probability of choosing subgroup h of g given that group g is chosen (the second factor in (5)).
In the second step, we use the aggregate demand expressions (7) to write the unobserved choice probabilities s j , s jjg and s 0 in terms of observables. Using (7), the choice probabilities are equal to the market shares in volume terms for the familiar unit demand model
and they are equal to market shares in value terms for the constant expenditures model
We can insert these expressions, together with the speci…cation (4) for j , into the inverted choice probability system (8). This results in the following estimating equations for the unit demand model
and for the constant expenditures model
The unit demand estimating equation (9) is the familiar one for the two-level nested logit. The constant expenditures estimating equation (10) has not been considered before, although it is equally simple. It di¤ers from the unit demand speci…cation in three respects. First, price enters logarithmically instead of linearly. Second, market shares are measured in value terms instead of volume terms. Third, the potential market is the total budget as a …xed fraction of GDP, B, instead of the total number of consumers, I.
6 Note that 6 Some other papers have used a logarithmic price term, for example Peters (2006 ) or Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009 ). Verboven (1996 uses a Box-Cox transformation of the price term, p j 1 = to nest both the linear and logarithmic speci…cations. While these approaches are useful to obtain a more ‡exible functional form for price, they are not consistent with utility maximization. As we show here, the logarithmic speci…cation can be made consistent after some simple adjustments regarding the computation of market shares and the potential market (and it is straightforward to generalize this to the Box-Cox transformation, but the model is then no longer linear in the parameters).
the unit demand speci…cation can immediately be interpreted as an inverse demand system (by writing price on the left hand side). This is not the case for the constant expenditures speci…cation. Both models can be estimated using an instrumental variable regression of volume or value market shares (relative to the outside good market share) on product characteristics, price and subgroup and group market shares, where the endogeneous variables are price and the (sub)group market shares.
Price elasticities Following Berry (1994), both demand speci…cations generate simple analytic expressions for the aggregate price elasticities of demand. To illustrate, consider the own-price elasticities. The derivatives of the choice probability (5) with respect to j can be shown to be
Using (7), the aggregate demand derivatives are Unit demand
Substituting (11) into (12), we obtain the aggregate own-price elasticity in the unit demand speci…cation
and in the constant expenditures speci…cation
These expressions reveal the well-known role of subgroup, group and overall market shares in the measurement of the price elasticities (in interaction with the nesting parameters 1 and 2 ). Furthermore, they show that in the typical unit demand speci…cation the own-price elasticities are increasing quasi-linearly in prices across products, whereas they are quasiindependent of prices in the constant expenditures demand speci…cation. 7 The Appendix provides similar expressions for the cross-price elasticities.
7 In both cases, we write "quasi", since there is indirect dependence on the prices through the market shares.
Oligopoly model
The oligopoly model serves two purposes. First, in combination with the demand parameters it enables one to uncover the premerger marginal costs. Second, based on the demand parameters and uncovered marginal costs, it can be used to predict the price e¤ects of the merger. We begin with the basic model where multi-product …rms set prices non-cooperatively. We then extend it to allow …rms to partially coordinate (to the same extent before and after the merger). We found the introduction of a partial coordination parameter a useful approach to calibrate the premerger marginal cost such that they are close to outside estimates for the marginal costs. Each …rm f owns a portfolio of products F f . Its total variable pro…ts are given by the sum of the pro…ts for each product k 2 F f :
where c k is the constant marginal cost for product k and q k (p) is demand, as given by (7), now written as a function of the J 1 price vector p. The pro…t-maximizing price of each product j = 1; : : : ; J should satisfy the following …rst-order condition:
A price increase a¤ects pro…ts through three channels. First, it directly raises pro…ts, proportional to current demand q j (p). Second, it lowers the product's own demand, which lowers pro…ts proportional to the current markup. Third, it raises the demand of the other products in the …rm's portfolio, which partially compensates for the reduced demand of the own product. If the …rst-order conditions (16) hold for all products j = 1 J, a multiproduct Bertrand-Nash equilibrium obtains.
To write this system of J …rst-order conditions in vector notation, de…ne the J J matrix F as the …rms'product ownership matrix, a block-diagonal matrix with a typical element F (j; k) equal to 1 if products j and k are produced by the same …rm and 0 otherwise. Let q(p) be the J 1 demand vector, and (p) @q(p)=@p 0 be the corresponding J J Jacobian matrix of …rst derivatives. Let c be the J 1 marginal cost vector. Using the operator to denote element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of the same dimension, we have
This can be inverted to give the following expression:
It is straightforward to generalize this expression to allow for (partial) coordinated behavior. Suppose that …rms put a weight 2 (0; 1) on the pro…ts of their competitors and modify the objective function (15) accordingly. The same expression (17) then obtains, where the zeros in the matrix F are replaced by the parameter . 8 Intuitively, (17) decomposes the price into two terms: marginal cost and a markup, which depends on the own-and cross-price elasticities of demand. The lower the own-price elasticities and the greater the cross-price elasticities, the greater will be the markup over marginal cost.
Equation (17) serves two purposes. First, it can be rewritten to uncover the pre-merger marginal cost vector c based on the pre-merger prices and estimated price elasticities of demand, i.e.
Second, (17) can be used to predict the post-merger equilibrium. The merger involves two possible changes: a change in the product ownership matrix from F;pre to F;post and, if there are e¢ ciencies, a change in the marginal cost vector from c pre to c post . To simulate the new price equilibrium, we used …xed point iteration on (17), and, if this fails to converge, we revert to the Newton method.
The merger simulation
We now present the results from the merger simulation. We deliberately chose to maintain the estimation and simulation methodology as developed during the merger investigation. We …rst present the estimation and speci…cation choices and then discuss the estimated demand parameters and the implied price elasticities. Finally, we present the simulated price e¤ects of the merging …rms, under a variety of scenario's considered during the investigation. While the model also makes other predictions (on competitor price increases, on market share changes), we do not present these here yet. We defer this to the next section, where we confront all predictions from the preferred demand model with what actually happened after the merger.
Estimation and speci…cation
Estimation We estimate the two versions of the nested logit model: the unit demand speci…cation (9) and the constant expenditures speci…cation (10). Several econometric is-sues need to be addressed. First, it is necessary to specify the potential market, i.e. the total number of potential consumers I in the unit demand model and the total potential budget B in the constant expenditures model. For both speci…cations, we assume that the potential market is twice the average amount spent over the entire period, in units for the …rst speci…cation and in values for the second speci…cation. We performed a sensitivity analysis with alternative factors: 1.5, 2 (base), 4 and 6 and obtained similar results. Second, we do not observe a single cross-section of products j = 1 J, but rather a panel of multiple periods (months and years during 1995-2008) . We therefore estimate the model including …xed e¤ects per product j to account for time-invariant unobserved product characteristics.
Third, the price variable and the group share variables ln s jjhg and ln s hjg are endogenous variables that may be correlated with the error term, even conditional on the …xed e¤ects. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) proposed to use sums of the characteristics of the other products, and counts of the number of products, over all products and over all competing …rms' products. For the nested logit model, Verboven (1996) suggested to also take the sums and counts by subgroups and groups. We follow the same approach here. Intuitively, identi…cation comes from the fact that the choice sets (number of products per subgroup, group, …rm and market) show variation over time.
Speci…cation Our maintained speci…cation de…nes the upper nesting level by the administrative form and the lower nesting level by the active substance. Under this nesting structure, consumers are most likely to substitute to another product of the same form and substance, and would substitute more to another substance than to another form. We also estimated a model with the reverse nesting order (where consumers would substitute more to another form than to another substance), but this led to estimates of the nesting parameters 1 < 2 , inconsistent with random utility theory. Following common practice (e.g. Goldberg, 1995), we therefore limit attention to the model that gave parameters consistent with random utility theory (1 1 2 0). We also estimated a constrained one-level nested logit models ( 1 = 2 ), where segmentation is either according to substance or form.
We estimated the model on both the full sample, and on the reduced sample with only the three main substances and two main forms. Since we obtained robust conclusions, we present only the results for the reduced sample: this was our preferred sample during the investigation since it already captures more than 90% of sales and reduces heterogeneity across (smaller) brands. For both samples, we estimated the model using the three di¤erent measures for the consumption unit (tablet, de…ned daily dose, and normal dose at a single occasion). Our base speci…cations are based on the tablet measure, but we also comment on the results for the other measures.
Both the unit demand and constant expenditures nested logit model include the following variables as determinants of mean utility (relative to the outside good): price (unit demand) or log of price (constant expenditures), marketing expenditures, the fraction of sick women and sick men in the total population, a time trend and monthly dummy variables capturing seasonal e¤ects. One of these explanatory variables, marketing expenditures, is potentially endogeneous. As in Chintagunta (2002), we treat it as exogenous, uncorrelated with the error term. This assumption may be justi…ed to the extent that the full set of product …xed e¤ects takes away the main source of correlation with the error term. Table 4 presents the estimated demand parameters for the base speci…cations of the unit demand and constant expenditures speci…cations. In both speci…cations most parameters have the expected sign and are estimated signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. As in Chintagunta (2002) , marketing expenditures have a positive e¤ect on the products' demands. There is a positive and signi…cant time trend, and monthly dummy variables indicate that demand for painkillers is especially strong during the winter months December and March. Demand grows with the number of sick men but, surprisingly, in the unit demand speci…cation it decreases with the number of sick women. This may be because this variable picks up some other e¤ects, or because women use other drugs (perhaps prescription drugs) when they report sickness.
Demand parameters and price elasticities
In both speci…cations the price coe¢ cient has the expected sign. The subgroup and group nesting parameters are fairly comparable ( 1 = 0:93 and 2 = 0:79 in the linear speci…cation, and 1 = 0:84 and 2 = 0:67 in the constant expenditures speci…cation). These estimates satisfy the requirements for the model to be consistent with random utility theory, 1 1 2 0. In both speci…cations, the inequalities are strict, which implies that consumers perceive products of the same form and substance as the closest substitutes, products of a di¤erent substance but the same form as weaker substitutes, and products with both di¤erent substance and di¤erent form as the weakest substitutes.
The bottom part of Table 4 shows what the estimates of , 1 and 2 imply for the ownand cross-price elasticities. The numbers refer to averages across products during December 2008, the last month of our dataset during the investigation. In the constant expenditures speci…cation, the average own-price elasticity is -2.7, while the cross-price elasticity is much larger for products of the same substance and form (0.17) than for products of a di¤erent substance but the same form (0.04), which in turn is larger than for products of di¤erent substance and form (0.01). There is a similar pattern in the unit demand speci…cation, but the level of elasticities is considerably higher. 
Predicted price e¤ects under alternative scenario' s
During the merger investigation by the Swedish competition authority, we reported the predicted price e¤ects from the merger under both the unit demand and the constant expenditures speci…cations. For each speci…cation, we considered four scenario's: no cost savings versus 25% cost savings, and multiproduct Bertrand competition versus partial coordination. The partial coordination parameter was calibrated to = 0:75, i.e. both before and after the merger all …rms take into account their competitors'pro…ts by 75% when setting their own prices. Calibrating = 0:75 leads to premerger marginal costs in line with outside information available to the competition authority, so it has some intuitive appeal as an alternative to Bertrand competition. Table 5 shows the pre-merger markups and predicted price increases, under the four scenario's and the two demand speci…cations. The predicted price increases are average percentage price increases in the paracetamol segment, where the merging …rms (and no other …rms) are active. Table 5 is essentially what we reported during the competition investigation. 10 We defer a richer and more systematic set of predictions from the merger simulations to our ex post analysis below. According to the constant expenditures speci…cation, the merger between AZT and GSK would lead to rather substantial price increases in the absence of e¢ ciencies: +34.1% under Bertrand competition, and +28.4% under partial coordination. The predicted price e¤ects only become small or negligible if the merger involves at least 25% marginal cost savings (price increase of +4.7% under Bertrand competition and -0.1% under partial coordination). These results therefore imply large e¢ ciency requirements for the merger to bene…t consumers. Nevertheless, during the investigation we stressed that caution was warranted, because such large price increases may not materialize if they trigger entry, a possibility that 9 It is of interest to compare these estimates with the ones from a unit demand random coe¢ cients logit, as obtained by Chintagunta (2002) . The estimates for the …ve analgesics brands he considered vary between -1.8 and -3.0. This is of a similar range as in the constant expenditure speci…cation. However, the variation in elasticities in Chintagunta's model is largely driven by variation in prices, whereas in our model it is mainly driven by variation in market shares. Also, while the own-price elasticities are comparable, the cross-price elasticities obtained by Chintagunta are considerably lower despite the fact that he considered only …ve products. 10 In the report to the Swedish competition authority we also presented the results from a constant expenditure speci…cation based on the full dataset instead of the reduced dataset. This gave very similar results. became more likely in light of the then coming deregulation of the distribution system. According to the unit demand model, the predicted price e¤ects from the merger are considerably smaller, but they remain quite substantial. In the absence of e¢ ciencies, the model predicts that the merging …rms would raise prices by +12.9% under Bertrand competition and by +16.1% under partial coordination. The lower predicted price e¤ects are due to the larger estimated price elasticities in the unit demand model. If we account for 25% cost savings, the predicted price e¤ects become negligible under Bertrand competition, but they remain signi…cant under partial coordination. In the unit demand model, the cost savings are passed on to a lesser extent than in the constant expenditures speci…cation. This clearly follows from the functional form: in the unit demand model consumers tend to become more price elastic as price increases, whereas they remain more or less equally price elastic in the constant expenditures speci…cation.
Despite the rather large predicted price increase in the constant expenditures speci…ca-tion, we favoured these results for two reasons. First, as discussed above, we considered the constant expenditures as our preferred base speci…cation, because it entailed a more plausible relationship between price elasticities and prices, and in particular because the pattern of price elasticities does not depend on the chosen unit of consumption (tablet, de…ned daily dose, or normal dose on a single occasion). Second, we found the computed premerger markups to be more plausible. As shown in the last column of Table 5 , in the constant expenditures model the average premerger markups are 49% under Bertrand competition 76% under partial coordination. These numbers were broadly in line with the variable cost information provided by the parties during the investigation (cost of purchasing the active substance, production cost and packaging cost). In contrast, in the unit demand speci…ca-tion, the average premerger markups are much smaller (16% under Bertrand competition and 54% under partial coordination) and in fact well below the markups from the parties' information.
In sum, the merger requires substantial cost savings, in the order of at least 25%, for the price e¤ects to become small. In the absence of cost savings, the preferred constant expenditures speci…cation predicts a very large price increase: +34% under Bertrand competition and +28.4% under partial coordination before the merger. The unit demand speci…cation predicts lower price increases, but still well above 10%. If one were to apply a SSNIP test for market de…nition, the conclusion would clearly be that the merging …rms constitute a monopoly by themselves.
Ex post merger analysis
We now confront the predicted merger e¤ects with what actually happened after the merger. We …rst provide a more systematic overview of a broad range of merger predictions under the preferred constant expenditures model, and then confront these with the actual e¤ects over a two-period window before and after the merger.
Predicted price and market share e¤ects in the preferred model
As discussed in section 4, during the investigation we focused on the predicted average price increase of the merging …rms. We now consider a much broader range of merger predictions: the predicted price increase by each of the merging …rms, the price increase by their competitors, and the market share e¤ects. To maintain focus, we now limit attention to our preferred model during the investigation, i.e. the constant expenditures nested logit where administrative form is the upper nest and active substance is the lower nest. We also only consider the scenario without e¢ ciencies, since there was no concrete evidence on the actual realization of e¢ ciencies.
The predicted merger e¤ects are shown in Table 6 , under columns 1 and 2 (prices) and columns 3 and 4 (market shares). Consider …rst the predicted price e¤ects at the level of the active substance (top panel). As already discussed, under Bertrand competition (column 1) the predicted price increase is a substantial 34.1% in the paracetamol segment (where only the merging …rms are active). Furthermore, prices in the other segments (where only the competitors are active) only increase by a small amount: by 0.7% for ibuprofen products and by +0.8% for ASA products. If …rms partially coordinate, the predicted price increase in paracetamol is lower at 28%, but the price increase in the competing segments of the other …rms becomes higher at 4.1% for Ibuprofen and 3% for ASA. The predicted price e¤ects at the level of the …rm give interesting additional insights (bottom panel). Perhaps most interestingly, the model predicts that the merging …rm with the lower pre-merger market share, GSK, raises its price by a much larger amount (+60% under Bertrand competition) than its partner with the larger market share, AZT (+21.3%). Intuitively, this follows from the fact that markups of small …rms tend to be lower than those of large …rms, and they become equalized after a merger (see already Anderson and de Palma, 1992) . The model also predicts that most competitors raise their prices by a negligible amount under Bertrand competition, but by a more sizeable amount under partial coordination. Now consider the predicted market shares e¤ects from the merger, measured in volume terms. Under Bertrand competition the paracetamol market share is predicted to decrease by 7.1% (from 47.9% to 40.8%). This comes to the bene…t of both ibuprofen and ASA (+3.8% and +3.3%). The larger …rm AZT is predicted to su¤er a market share drop of -3.4% (from 36.1% to 32.7%), while the smaller partner GSK will su¤er a proportionately more substantial market share drop of -3.7% (from 11.8% to 8.1%). These market share e¤ects are qualitatively similar under partial coordination, though quantitatively less pronounced.
Actual price and market share e¤ects
We can now confront these various predictions with the actual price and market share e¤ects following the merger. We use a two-year comparison window around the merger event of Price e¤ects Figure ? ? shows the price evolution during both periods for the three main segments: paracetamol, ibuprofen and ASA. The results are striking. In the paracetamol segment, where the merging …rms AST and GSK are the only competitors, average prices increase from about 1.5 SEK to 2 SEK, already one month after the merger. The price increase is especially striking since prices only show a small gradual increase two years prior to the merger (from SEK1.4 to SEK 1.5) and remained more or less constant after the sharp increase just after the merger. Only near the end of the period, there is a slight tendency of a price drop, perhaps associated with new entry threats following the deregulation. In sharp contrast, in the ibuprofen segment prices remained stable after the merger, whereas in the ibuprofen segment they appear to increase by a modest amount (from 1.4 SEK to 1.55 SEK). This suggests that the sharp price increase by the merging …rms was indeed due to the merger, and not due to a general cost or demand shock unrelated to the merger.
To gain further insights on this, we estimate the following regression, in line with Ashenfelter and and other recent work on ex post merger evaluation discussed in the introduction ln p it = i + i P ostM erger t + " it ;
where p it is the average price of "product group" i, and P ostM erger t is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the merger event.
11 The literature sometimes assumes that the merger does not have an impact on the competitors'prices. If this assumption is satis…ed, one can interpret this regression as a di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator, where the di¤erence between the merging …rms' i and the competitors' i measures the merger price e¤ect. In practice, it is possible that the merger raises the competitors' prices (under Bertrand competition, but especially if there is some coordination, as the merger simulations also predict). If this is the case, the di¤erence between the merging …rms'and the competitors' i 's can be viewed as a lower bound for the merger price e¤ect. We de…ne the product group i in the above regression at three levels: the substance, the …rm and the product. Since we obtained similar results, we only presents the results at Table 7 shows the results. According to column 1 (top panel), the merger led to a log price increase of 0.351 in the paracetamol segment, implying an average price increase of the merged …rms'products by 42%. This is of a same order of magnitude, and in fact even larger than the already large predicted price increase of 34% under Bertrand competition.
Why did such a large and sudden price increase not raise a signi…cant amount of controversy in Sweden? In fact, the merged …rm AZT-GSK implemented the price increase by reducing their packsizes from 30 to 20 tablets, while reducing prices per package by only a small amount, for example from 41.5 crowns to 38.5 crowns for one of their most selling products. The reduction in packsize had been required by the Swedish medical products agency (Läkemedelsverket), because of concerns with a too wide availability of painkillers. While the …rms argued that the price increase was warranted because of the increased costs with the reduced package size, this appears implausible because other companies had also been required to lower packsizes and this did not coincide with large price increases. If one would account for a modest increase in the packaging costs, the predicted price increase from the merger simulation model would become even closer to the actual price increase. The merger simulation model thus performed quite well in predicting the average price increase of the merging …rms. But we can dig deeper, thanks to the particularly large size of the merger. We now consider how well the model predicted other e¤ects: the average price changes in the competing segments and the price increases of the individual …rms. First, the price regression at the level of the substance shows that ibuprofen prices essentially remained constant (+0.1%), which is consistent with the model predictions. But the ASA prices increased by 0.10 (in logs) or 11%, which is much larger than the model predic-tions (+0.8% under Bertrand competition and +3.0% under partial coordination). Using the di¤erence-in-di¤erence interpretation of Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) , we would conclude that the price increase caused by the merger is 0.35 (in logs) or 42.0% if ibuprofen is the control group, and 0.251 (in logs) or 29% if ASA is the control group. The merger simulation prediction of 34% falls in between these bounds.
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Second, the price regression at the level of the …rms (column 1, bottom panel) shows that both of the merging …rms raised their prices substantially and more or less proportionately: AZT by 0.356 or 43% and GSK by 0.379 or 46%. The price increase is thus slightly smaller for the bigger …rm (AZT) than for the smaller …rm (GSK). But the merger simulations predicted a much wider di¤erence between both …rms (+21% for the bigger …rm versus +60% for the smaller …rm). The competitors raised their prices by much lower or negligible amounts (Bayer by +0.105, P…zer by +0.084, Meda by +0.029 and Nycomed by +0.012): this is again qualitatively consistent with the model, but not quantitatively, since the model predicted negligible price increases (under Bertrand competition).
Market share e¤ects Did the large price increase of the merging …rms also a¤ect market shares? Figure 3 shows the market share evolution (expressed in volumes), using the same comparison window as Figure 2 . This shows that the market share of the merging …rms' paracetamol segment suddenly dropped by a sizeable 5% (down from about 47% to about 42%), whereas the market share of especially ibuprofen increased sharply (from about 27% to 32%). It is less clear from Figure 3 whether these market share changes were permanent, since they show some volatility over the sample. We therefore estimated a regression similar to (18), but with the log of price replaced by the market share as the dependent variable (again, in line with Ashenfelter and Hosken's (2008) ex post study).
The market share of the paracetamol segment, occupied by the merging …rms, dropped by a signi…cant 3.3% (95% con…dence interval of 2.7%-3.9%). This loss was entirely in favor of the ibuprofen market share, which increased by a substantial 5.0%. The market share of ASA unexpectedly, decreased (by 1.6%). Interesting additional …ndings obtain for the market shares at the level of the …rms. Despite the fact that prices increased slightly more for GSK than for AZT products, AZT experienced the largest market share drop (-5.6%, compared with an insigni…cant -0.3% for GSK). P…zer also experienced a market share drop (-2.7%), whereas the other competitors all experienced market share increases.
In sum, several of the estimated market share e¤ects are, at least qualitatively, in line 12 If we follow other work and estimate a restricted version of (18) with the merger predictions: the market share decrease of paracetamol in favor of ibuprofen. But the market share drop of ASA is inconsistent with the merger predictions (as it was predicted to gain from the merger). Similarly, the insigni…cant market share drop of one of the merging …rms, GSK, is not consistent with the predicted market share drop for GSK.
13
A possible explanation for the deviations between actual and predicted market share e¤ects is that other things did not remain equal after the merger. For example, the market share of ASA already shows a small gradual decline during the two-year period before the merger. Also, the insigni…cant drop in GSK's market share (at the expense of the bigger drop in AZT's market share) may be related to the fact that GSK was the acquiring …rm. After the merger it may have restructured its operations to favour the GSK brands, which would bene…t GSK's market share. An alternative explanation for the deviations is of course that the merger simulation model is not speci…ed correctly in all respects. We already noted the property of the logit model with Bertrand competition that markups are equalized across products of a multi-product …rm. This is driven by functional forms and may not be realistic in practice.
Conclusions
We have made use of a unique "natural experiment" to measure a merger's e¤ects, and in particular to evaluate the usefulness of merger simulation as a "structural approach" to predict the e¤ects from mergers. The merger case is unique for several reasons. First, it involves large players who have no other competition in their own segment. This leads to large merger predictions, enabling us to test a broad range of predictions. Second, the merger simulation methodology was entirely implemented during the case, without information on the actual merger e¤ects.
The merger simulation model started from a two-level nested logit demand system, where we proposed a constant expenditures speci…cation as an alternative to the typical unit demand speci…cation. Our empirical results show the following two key points. First, market segmentation according to active substance is a very important di¤erentiation dimension. This implies that the two merging …rms form a strong competitive constraint on prices before the merger. Second, the constant expenditures speci…cation entails a more plausible pattern of price elasticities across products. Based on these two …ndings, the model predicts a large price increase of 34% by the merging …rms.
Our ex post analysis shows that the actual price increase by the merging …rms is of a similar order of magnitude, but in fact even larger than the price increase predicted by the model: +42% in absolute terms, or +35% in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence interpretation where the other …rms are the control group. The average price predictions are thus quite accurate, but a closer look leads to more nuanced conclusions. First, both merging …rms raised their prices by a similar percentage, while the simulation model predicted a larger price increase for the smaller …rm. Second, although the merging …rms'market share dropped, as predicted by the model, some of the outsiders'market shares also dropped (in favor of other outsiders). We discussed possible reasons for the divergence between the predicted and actual e¤ects, i.e. the possibility that other things did not remain constant after the merger or that the model speci…cation can be improved. It was possible to test these richer predictions, thanks to the unusually large size of the considered merger (where the two merging …rms are the only competitors in a segment with limited substitution from other segments).
It is interesting to observe that our predictions were obtained from a fairly simple di¤er-entiated products oligopoly model without the "elaborate superstructure"to which Angrist and Pischke refer in their discussion. In future research it may nevertheless be interesting to consider various extensions of the model (alternative equilibrium, further sensitivity of functional form of demand) to see whether these can improve the accuracy of the predictions. But in our view more importantly, it would be interesting to see a lot more work that confronts the merger simulations during a case with the actual merger e¤ects.
